Our Pakistan Problem

Pakistan has been a problem for the United States for awhile on the terrorism front, but the takedown of Osama bin Laden in that country this month brought the matter into even more pronounced relief.

Unfortunately, it's a problem that's not likely to go away anytime soon -- or easily.

Of course, there is the matter of Osama having lived in "plain sight" in the Pakistani garrison town of Abbottabad, some 50 miles from the capital of Islamabad, for perhaps as long five years.

While still unanswered, questions of Pakistan's counterterrorism competence or complicity in the matter have sent Washington-Islamabad relations to a new low, fed by a furious foray of finger-pointing.

We may never know exactly how Osama was able to elude detection of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. But the problems didn't start with, nor will they end with, Osama.

Though Islamabad has been helpful in bringing down some al Qaeda kingpins, like 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who fled Afghanistan for the tribal areas and large cities across the border in Pakistan, Osama and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri strangely eluded capture.

Indeed, Pakistan responded to claims by the United States that bin Laden and Zawahiri were ensconced in Pakistan as a Western conspiracy that they claimed had no basis in fact.

But it's wasn't just Osama and Zawahiri.

Experts believe the ISI has been involved with some other terrorist groups as well, like the Taliban, the Haqqani insurgent network and Lashkar e Taiba, responsible for the attacks in Mumbai, India in 2008.

The Taliban, of course, is the main insurgent group in Afghanistan, and gave safe haven to Osama and al Qaeda operatives when it ruled most of the country in the days before 9/11.

Despite demands from the United States, it also refused to turn over bin Laden after 9/11, which led to the American invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001.

The Taliban was actually created by the ISI in the 1980s to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It's widely believed that they would likely allow its ally al Qaeda to return in force to Afghanistan should it prevail in the current war.

Today, the Taliban finds sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan, allowing it to plan, train, and re-supply in relative safety from the 140,000 U.S. and Coalition forces operating across the border in Afghanistan.

(CIA drone operations are a welcome exception to that situation.)

Taliban leaders are also known to populate the Pakistani border city of Quetta, when not in Afghanistan fighting. Among those leaders is the notorious Taliban military commander Mullah Omar -- the one who refused to surrender Osama after 9/11.

The safe harbor the Taliban gets in Pakistan, especially for its commanders, is arguably the most consequential factor preventing the ultimate defeat of the terror group in Afghanistan.

The infamous Haqqani network, which operates from Pakistani tribal areas, only makes the situation in Afghanistan more difficult for Afghan and Coalition forces. It has ties to the Taliban, al Qaeda and the ISI.

The ISI's involvement in terror directed at India over issues such as Kashmir has sent the two nuclear-weapons states to the brink of war--not to mention the loss of life involved in horrific attacks in places like Mumbai.

A large conventional war between New Delhi and Islamabad is a future possibility, and a nuclear exchange -- the world's first -- is not out of the question. Both countries have in excess of 100 nuclear weapons.

It's also possible that these groups alone, or together, (particularly the Taliban) could turn on Islamabad, even using Afghanistan as a staging ground. This situation might lead to the fall of the central government of their former allies.

While the irony of that happening might seem delicious on some levels, all of Pakistan being ruled by a terror group is a troubling prospect, especially considering who might come to control its nuclear arsenal.

The Taliban recently conducted an attack on a Pakistani government target in retaliation for the death of bin Laden, resulting in their worst terror attack this year. More than 3,000 people were killed in terror attacks in Pakistan last year alone.

Unfortunately, while Pakistan is a problem for the United States, disengaging completely is also a problem. Having no influence there will only exacerbate the situation for our interests in securing Afghanistan and fighting terrorism.

While there will be pushback from Islamabad on any demands that Washington makes, the Osama fiasco does provide some leverage in gaining additional cooperation on matters that threaten both Pakistani and American interests.

The challenge will be getting Islamabad to understand that tackling these issues is in our mutual interest. Unfortunately, it won't be the first time we've tried to convince Pakistan of this.

As usual, getting Pakistan to take the steps necessary to address the deadly serious matters at hand will not be an easy or short-term task. But any cooperation, sadly to say, is better than no cooperation at all.

--
Peter Brookes is the Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense